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We consider decentralized Energy Markets whose underlining power grid topol-
ogy consists of generators, consumers, and transmission lines, and which is divided
into regions. In the absence of a central System Operator, the Market Location
Prices should be computed with coordination between the regions. The local re-
gions perform local Optimal Power Flow (OPF) steps which are subsequently clued
together with respect to certain operational constraints using the Alternating Direc-
tion Method of Multipliers (ADMM). This problem leads itself to a decentralized
coordination problem and the Blockchain Technology seems to be its proper and
effective backbone. The regions communicate through an Ethereum distributed ap-
plication (dApp). The Proof of Authority (PoA) consensus algorithm is used, and
blocks are created when an optimal global solution has been found. The integration
of the Blockchain Technology in the ADMM algorithm is the main contribution of
this paper.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In a competitive Electricity Market, all participants would enjoy its advantages:
There are no limits to enter the Market, everyone is able to trade electricity, every
participant determines how much is willing to pay for the electricity commodity. In
the case of a simple Energy Market consisting of generators and consumers, each
generator would declare how much energy is willing to supply and at what cost,
and each consumer would declare his demands and the price he is willing to pay.
A market equilibrium is obtained when the social welfare is maximized: No one
"loses" money and everybody gets what deserves.
However, electricity is a special commodity. Generators and consumers are part
of a power transmission topology. When energy is transmitted from one point to
another, it obeys to some physical laws. There cannot be agreements between par-
ticipants to trade certain amount of energy, ignoring the power flows of the rest
topology. For that reason, the concept of the System Operator is introduced. The
System Operator is responsible to balance supply and demand in a given energy
system (obeying the power flow laws), maximizing in parallel the social welfare. His
role can be described as an auctioneer who guarantees legitimate power flows in the
topology. The literature indicates that the System Operator solves Optimal Power
Flow Problems to achieve his goal, which consist of complex non-linear problems.
When we refer to a competitive Electricity Market, trustfulness among all the
participants is implied. But the whole operation is based on a centralized System
Operator. This arises concerns about the incentives behind his role. Price manipula-
tion for his one benefit could be one incentive. Moreover, it is assumed that the Sys-
tem Operator has the necessary information about the whole topology. This may not
be a realistic case, for example a lot of energy systems are divided into autonomous
regions. The need of decentralizing the role of the System Operator is obvious.
The main challenge of decentralization is to distribute the Optimal Power Flow
(OPF) problem into the regions; decentralized System Operators. With the integra-
tion of the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), the fully decen-
tralization of the system is achieved. The regions solve local OPF problems and
communicate with each other in order to find a globally optimal solution - which
maximizes the total social welfare.
The computation part of the decentralized algorithm is solved by the ADMM,
however proper communication between the regions is a key point. In this paper,
it will be shown how Blockchain Technology could be utilized in order to provide
a trustful and secure communication. In particular, a private Ethereum network is
used as the communication backbone, which is suitably modified for the adaption on
the ADMM algorithm. Using the Blockchain Technology together with the ADMM
algorithm for OPF problems was the paper’s main contribution.
Experiments of this paper’s implementation are provided and analyzed. The
quality of the solution is tested, alternating different kind of parameters, and blockchain
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metrics are also discussed. Additional research opportunities and similar researches
are also highlighted.
Specifically, next in Chapter 2 we briefly present the required background knowl-
edge on Energy Markets. Chapter 3 contains the specification of the Power Flow
problem in an energy system. The Optimal Power Flow problem is especially ana-
lyzed as it provides Economic Dispatch to an Energy Market. Chapter 4 addresses
the reasons to decentralize the Energy Markets and assays how the integration of the
ADMM can distribute the Optimal Power Flow problem into autonomous decentral-
ized subproblems. Chapter 5 presents the Blockchain Technology, its key elements
and how it is integrated into Smart Grids and Energy Market by different researches.
In Chapter 6 we present our idea on how the Blockchain could be integrated in the
ADMM algorithm for Optimal Power Flow problems, providing the Design and Im-
plementation of the Architecture and some experimental results.Moreover, in Chap-
ter 6 similar research is addressed and possible future improvements. Finally, Chap-
ter 7 makes an overall conclusion of this paper.
3Chapter 2
Competitive Electricity Markets
2.1 Electricity Markets
The main components of the electricity system are presented in [1] and are summa-
rized below.
The traditional power system consists of the physical infrastructure for electricity
generation, transport and use (Figure 2.1) on one hand, and an organized electricity
market on the other
The physical grid, that is, the flow of electricity, consists of electricity genera-
tors and electricity-transport systems, which are usually subdivided into systems
for transmission over long distances and systems for distribution to residential and
industrial consumers of electricity. The electricity market, that is the flow of money,
consists of:
electricity suppliers, who buy electricity from generators and sell it to consumers;
consumers, who use electricity and pay suppliers via their bills;
transmission system operators (TSO), who are paid for the long-distance transport
of electricity and for ensuring system stability;
distribution network operators (DSO), who are paid for delivering electricity to
consumers;
regulators, who set rules and oversee the functioning of the market.
In this paper’s study, generators, consumers or loads will be the key compo-
nents of the electricity system. Transmission and distribution lines are considered to
behave the same. As decentralization of the system will be introduced later, various
FIGURE 2.1: Schematic overview of the electricity system [1]
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authority-forms of the electricity system will be absent. System Operators will be
part of the system but their behavior will be drastically changed due to the decen-
tralization induced.
One relationship that connects the generating power and the consumer accord-
ing to [1] is the following :
The electricity supply must be equal to the electricity demand at all times, other-
wise the system risks breaking down. Traditionally, non-flexible generators are used
for serving the base load (the normal level of electricity use), while flexible genera-
tors are used for meeting peaks in demand. The increased share of variable capacity,
such as wind and solar, means that more flexible generation capacity is needed to
satisfy demand when production from variable generators is low.
The reader should keep in mind that when speaking about electricity markets,
payments between generators and consumers are involved. It is natural to think
that in peak demands, the power pricing increases as more expensive generators are
attached in the system to meet supply-demand balance.
The main components that affect the electricity system/market are the genera-
tors. Electricity generators come in various sizes, starting from rooftop solar panels
or small waterwheels (with a generation capacity starting from around 1 kW) to
large hydro- electric dams, nuclear or coal power stations (with capacities of several
GigaWatts). Generators are rated by their generation capacity, that is, the maximum
power they can produce. Firm-capacity generators can be switched on or off on de-
mand. Variable-capacity generators dependent on factors like wind or sunshine and
are therefore only able to generate certain amounts at certain times. Generators also
differ with respect to the flexibility with which they can be operated. Some genera-
tion technologies, such as nuclear, are well-suited for producing a stable amount of
electricity over longer periods, while others can change production more rapidly to
adapt to fluctuations in electricity demand and in production from variable sources.
A summary of generation characteristic is presented in Table 2.1 and is taken
from [1].
Type
firm /
variable
type of
fuel
flexibility
low
car-
bon
CO2 emis-
sions (kg
per kWh)
coal firm fossil medium no 0.95
natural gas firm fossil high no 0.55
biomass firm renewable medium yes
regrowth
of biomass
com-
pensates
emissions
nuclear firm nuclear low
considered as
zero-emission
energy sources
hydro with dam firm renewable very high
solar variable renewable very low
wind variable renewable very low
geothermal firm renewable high
TABLE 2.1: Characteristics of the main energy-generation technolo-
gies [1].
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Subsequently, the definition and some characteristics of Competitive Electricity
Markets is presented. Our vision and to some extend the content is this chapter is
influenced by the seminal work of Prof. William Hogan of John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University [2], [3]. It is worth to state the following two
paragraphs of his work un-altered.
The electric industry and its regulation are in a period of restructur-
ing and reform. A competitive market model reflecting and respecting
the distinctive features of electricity supply can serve at least three func-
tions as part of this process of reform. First, a well defined competitive
model could guide interim steps during the transition by providing a
goal or a destination for the end of the path of policy reform. Second,
a consistent, efficient competitive model provides a standard of compar-
ison for evaluating alternative market structure compromises that may
be proposed as workable approximations. Third, a competitive market
model could serve as a background for testing corporate strategies.
A competitive market includes open access with unrestricted entry
by new participants willing to absorb ordinary business risks. The ideal
case of the competitive market presumes a large number of competitors
with no barriers to entry or exit. In practice, the interest is in workable
competition, not the perfect case. And workable competition, compared
to other realistic and less competitive alternatives, may exist even in the
absence of an ideal market. However, the ideal case provides the simple
benchmark where participants do not have market power in the sense
of being able to maintain sustained and substantial profits that would
disappear with significant new entry. Ultimately the competitive market
model must be examined as to the degree of workable competition that
is feasible in the electricity market.
Hogan considers the two different cases of competitive markets that are graph-
ically depicted in Figure 2.2. The usual separation of the industry distinguishes
among generation, transmission and distribution. Firstly, a competitive wholesale
market structure is illustrated that follows this traditional three-part segmentation
and emphasizes competition in the generation market. The second market struc-
ture encompasses a more fully unbundled potential, recognizing that a more limited
version of competition is possible in principle. This further segmentation separates
possibly competitive functions within generation and distribution. Not all these seg-
ments need to be distinct; competitive firms may operate in more than one segment
as long as competition remains. The key elements of these structures are:
Generation
Fuelco: Purchases fuels for electricity generating plants. There are many sellers and
many buyers in regional and national markets.
Genco: Operates and maintains existing generating plants. The Gencos interact
with the short term market acting on behalf of the plant owners to bid into
the short-term power pool for economic dispatch. There are many participants
with existing plants and no barriers to entry for construction of new plants.
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(A) Wholesale. (B) Fully Unbundled.
FIGURE 2.2: Two different Competitive Electricity Markets [2].
Sellco: Markets long-term power supply compensation contracts to provide price
hedges for customers and generators. May also participate in decision making
for development of new Gencos. There are many participants and no barriers
to entry.
Transmission/Distribution
Poolco: Dispatches existing generating plants and operates a short-term market.
Operates a system providing long-term transmission compensation contracts.
System control interactions require monopoly operation or close coordination.
This segment is regulated to provide open access, comparable service and cost
recovery.
Gridco: Constructs and maintains the network of transmission wires. Network in-
teraction and scale economies call for monopoly provision and entry barriers.
This segment is regulated to provide non-discriminatory connections, compa-
rable service and cost recovery.
Brokeco: Matches buyers and sellers as brokers of long-term power supply and
transmission compensation contracts. There are many potential participants
and no barriers to entry.
Buyco: Purchasing long-term power supply and transmission compensation con-
tracts for final customers. There are many potential participants and no barri-
ers to entry.
Lineco: Constructs and maintains distribution wires connecting transmission grid
to final customers. Network interactions and scale economies call for monopoly
provision and entry barriers. This segment is regulated to provide non-discriminatory
connections, comparable service and cost recovery.
Disco: Provides services to final customers including connection and billing. There
are many potential entrants and no barriers to entry.
In this paper we restrict ourselves the first structure of the Electricity Market
(Figure 2.2A). For the purposes of this paper, there is no need to emphasize into a
fully unbundled market. Moreover, the transmission and distribution components
coincide. This produces more simplicity without affecting the final results of the
implemented decentralization. Most cases that are experimented do not dissociate
these two components.
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2.2 Short Run Markets
The period of the short-run markets is short on human scale. It currently runs every
15 minutes, this is expected soon to reduce to 5 minutes and in the not so far future to
1 minute, which we make call almost real-time. We assume here that generators and
customers are in the same location - there are no transmission lines. The generators’
operational costs form the "merit order", from the least to the most expensive. Cus-
tomers have power demands which are sensitive to prices. All this supply-demand
information is gathered at a power pool. What is now to be determined is how and
how much power will be supplied from generators to customers. Note that it is not
necessary that all power plants should be operational run [4].
A centralized System Operator (SO) has to determine the least-cost dispatch,
which matches efficiently the total supply with the total demand. This economic
dispatch maximizes the social welfare. In Figure 2.3a a locational supply-demand
curve is presented, with non-dispatchable loads. Note that the "cheapest" genera-
tors supply power to the customers. We assume that the generators inform the SO
about their operating costs or the SO has this information in advance. In a decentral-
ized market, these costs can be replaced by generators’ ask prices, thus generators
are essentially acting like sellers. Similarly, costumers can act like buyers and pro-
vide bid prices (and quantities) for their demand. The SO acts like an auctioneer
and chooses some price p that clears the market: all the sellers who asked less than
p sell and all buyers who bid more than p buy. An example is shown in Figure 2.3b.
This mechanism for determining the balance that maximizes benefits for producers
and consumers at the market equilibrium price is called Double Auction [5], or more
specifically uniform price double auction.
(A) Least-cost dispatch.(Source) (B) Economic dispatch [5].
FIGURE 2.3: Supply-demand curves.
2.2.1 Double Auctions and Bidding Strategies
Already some questions may arise regarding the clearing price’s choice. An ideal
mechanism would satisfy the following properties (see here).
Individual Rationality (IR): no person should lose from joining the auction. In par-
ticular, for every trading buyer: p ≤ B, and for every trading seller: p ≥ S .
Balanced Budget (BB) comes in two flavors:
• Strong balanced budget (SBB): all monetary transfers must be done be-
tween buyers and sellers; the auctioneer should not lose or gain money.
• Weak balanced budget (WBB): the auctioneer should not lose money, but
may gain money
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Truthfulness (TF), also called Incentive Compatibility (IC) or strategy-proofness:
• The stronger notion is known with the term dominant-strategy-incentive-
compatibility (DSIC), which means that reporting the true value should
be a dominant strategy for all players. I.e, a player should not be able to
gain by spying over other players and trying to find an optimal declaration
which is different from his true value, regardless of how the other players
play.
• The weaker notion is Nash-equilibrium-incentive-compatibility (NEIC),
which means that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all players
report their true valuations. I.e, if all players but one are truthful, it is best
for the remaining player to also be truthful.
Economic Efficiency (EE) where the total social welfare (the sum of the values of
all players) should be the best possible. In particular, meaning that, after all
trading has completed, the items should be in the hands of those that value
them the most.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to achieve all these requirements through a partic-
ular mechanism (see theorem in [6]). Surely there exist several mechanisms that
satisfy some of them. The Clearing Price Mechanism is widely used in energy mar-
ket auctions. Next we analyze this mechanism, by stating below the properties that
it enjoys.
• IR - since the buyer pays less than his value and the seller receives more than
his value.
• BB - because all monetary transfers are between buyers and sellers.
• TF (partially) - clearing price is affected by the k-th seller and buyer. Buyer k
has an incentive to report a lower value and seller k has an incentive to report
a higher value.
• EE - maximum social welfare is achieved by design.
We could already realize that relying on a centralized System Operator for defin-
ing the clearing prices and scheduling the power dispatch arises different kind of
incentives. Such a case is shown on Figure 2.4: Although the marker participants
would expect a justice market, the auctioneer (System Operator) may behave for his
one benefit. As it shown, the auctioneer announces different clearing prices to the
generators and consumers. Consumers pay more than expected, generators get paid
less than expected, and the difference is kept as his own profit.
Moreover, as the Clearing Price mechanism does not guarantee total truthful-
ness, some automated bidding strategies may be lying behind the bids/asks of the
players. Some bidding strategies are mentioned below. Currently there is not an
analytical solution if some strategies are superior to others in Double Auctions. Sev-
eral automated bidding strategies have been proposed and they are evaluated under
simulations, concepts of game theories and trading competitions. Researchers de-
clare that double auctions appear to be too complex to yield a clear game-theoretic
solution.
The Zero Intelligence strategy is the simplest as it bids at random, given a price
interval. The Zero Intelligence Plus strategy bids initially at random but then em-
ploys simple heuristic mechanisms to adjust its profit margin based on market data.
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FIGURE 2.4: Dishonest Auctioneer ([7])
The Kaplan Strategy is also relatively simple. It only submits matching bids, and
thus it never maintains outstanding bids in the market. The Aggressive Adaptive
strategy is predictive and history-based bidding strategy and is based on estima-
tions of the equilibrium obtained by the moving average method. More details about
bidding strategies can be found in [5], [8].
However, most of the bidding strategies can be used only in Continuous Double
Auction Markets. Since our cases are mostly Clear House Double Auctions -meaning
that there is only a single round to determine the clearing price- no more focus will
be given on analyzing different bidding strategies.
2.3 Transmission Pricing
The markets discussed in the previous section are referring to a particular location
only, where all the generators and consumers are connected. However, in reality not
all the power is generated and consumed in the same location. Generators, powers
plants, consumers are connected through transmission and distribution lines. This
crucial detail introduces the concept of transmission pricing.
The power flow is determined by physical laws and not by "contract paths" com-
ing solely from the clearing prices. The short-run market gets more complicated
as we have to consider transmission losses and possible congestions costs. Trans-
mission lines have resistance which create losses. These losses yield that some gen-
erators may need to produce more power to meet the consumers’ demands. This
increased production affects the market equilibrium, so different locational clearing
prices need to be introduced. Transmission congestions, which occur because some
transmission lines have a power transmission limit, affect more dramatically the
locational prices. Because of these limits, consumers may not have the possibility
to purchase power from cheap generators. Some of these generators may be con-
strained off, because transmission lines have reached their limits - no more power is
possible to be transmitted by those generators ( [9], [4] ).
A simple example ([4]) is illustrated for a better understanding in Figure 2.5,
under the following assumptions
• Two locations, A and B
• Total load at location B is 600 MW. For simplicity, the load is fixed, with no
demand bidding.
• A transmission line between A and B with varying capacity that enable us to
construct various cases. Transmission losses are ignored.
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FIGURE 2.5: Example of Transmission with Pool Bids [4].
• Pool bid generation at both A and B. To simplify, each location has the same
bid curve, starting at 2 cents/kwh and increasing by 1 cent/kwh for each 100
MW. Hence, a market price of 5 cents at A would yield 300 MW of pool-based
generation at that location. Likewise for location B.
The SO accepts the bids of those participating in the spot market at A and B. The
load is fixed at 600 MW and must be met from the spot market to include production
at A or B, and use of the transmission line. Based on the power generation at each
location, which is affected by the transmission congestion, the SO sets the locational
prices at both locations for each case (the results are gathered in Table 2.2):
• In the cases of 400 MW and 300 MW of transmission capacity, the economic
dispatch solution is just balanced with no congestion. Everyone sees the same
price of 5 cents.
• In the case of 200 MW of transmission capacity, the economic dispatch solu-
tion encounters transmission congestion, and the prices differ by location. The
price at A drops to 4 cents, and the price at B rises to 6 cents. The opportunity
cost of transmission is 2 cents.
• In the case of 100 MW there is also transmission congestion. Now, the price
at A drops to 3 cents, and the price at B rises to 7 cents, making a 4 cents
opportunity cost.
Power Flows and Locational Prices
Alternative Cases
Link Capacity from A to B MW 400 300 200 100
Total Load at B MW 600 600 600 600
Price at A cents/kwh 5 5 4 3
Price at B cents/kwh 5 5 6 7
Transmission Price cents/kwh 0 0 2 4
TABLE 2.2: Results for the Example Cases [4].
From the above example, we can see that when there is transmission congestion,
the locational prices are different. The opportunity cost (i.e. transmission price) is
not given to a generator or to a consumer, but represents a surplus for the system.
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This revenue can be shared between all participants or can be granted to the Sys-
tem Operator as a reward. If the market consists of transmission line providers or
capacity right holders, congestion costs are payments for their services. But in any
case, the revenues are controlled by a centralized System Operator, so again trust
becomes an issue. The System Operator could manipulate power dispatch for his
own benefits, ignoring the goal of maximizing the social welfare.
2.4 Long-Run Market Contracts
The spot-market pricing has a lot of risks. When demand is more expensive power
will be purchased, changing the market equilibrium. When transmission constraints
bind, congestion costs make also the market equilibrium more volatile. Generators
and consumers are facing price instabilities and might be interested in long-term
mechanism to mitigate them.
A choice is long-term contracts between generators and consumers for trading
certain amount of power for a certain price. But when we speak about electricity,
the power flow is dictated by physical laws. Generators just supply power to the
grid and consumers just take power from the grid. It is very difficult to discover
which generator is supplying to which consumer, so the concept of the long-term
contracts needs to change its character. Long-term contracts are translated to what is
called "contracts of price difference". That means if a generator and a consumer have
agreed on a specific pricing, and the spot market pricing is different from the agreed
one, then the "winning" player owns the price difference to the "losing" player. How-
ever, System Operators do not need to have information about long-term contracts,
they just need to decide on a power dispatch, regardless any agreements between
the players. Long-term contracts are not affected by centralized or decentralized
operation.
Similarly, congestion contracts could provide protection against changing loca-
tional prices. These contracts can be allocated to certain participants based on histor-
ical rights, on current negotiations or on open auctions. In general, transmission con-
gestion contracts are equivalent to just such perfectly tradeable transmission rights.
The congestion revenue is distributed among congestion contract holders. In addi-
tion, the congestion contract holders will have to compensate for differences in the
congestion costs between different locations across the network. In a system with
congestion contracts, the System Operators do not have the incentive to manipulate
the dispatch, as it is not beneficial to them.
More details about Long-Run Market are available in [3], [4].
2.5 Conclusion on Bid-Based Energy Markets
We conclude this chapter with the following very accurate and elucidating statement
by Hogan [4].
A pool-based, short-term electricity market coordinated by a system op-
erator provides a foundation for building a system that provided eco-
nomic dispatch. Coordination through the system operator is unavoid-
able, and spot-market locational prices define the opportunity costs of
transmission that would determine the market value of the transmission
rights without requiring physical trading and without restricting the ac-
tual use of the system.
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Please note that relying on a centralized System Operation is a natural monopoly
and the operator could distort both dispatch and expansion. The introduction of a
decentralized approach towards this matter would reinforce trust among the par-
ticipants and the system. Trust suggests lack of individual incentives, making the
investment on energy markets more appealing.
Finally, we should make clear that the above discussion on energy markets con-
cerns the somehow simplified models that govern them and does not touch several
important technical and practical issues that come from the power engineering and
control thematic area. We believe that these issues are orthogonal to our study.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Power Flow
3.1 Introduction
As it was stated above, generators just inject power to grid and consumers take out
power from the grid. There cannot be agreements between individual participants to
exchange certain amounts of power, ignoring the characteristics of the transmission
grid. Electricity is a special commodity, and respects always some physical laws. So,
when we consider an Energy Market with transmission lines, i.e. power flows from
location to location, the market equilibrium should consider the physical limitations
of the system, also knows as the Power Flow Problem. The Optimal Power Flow
Problem introduces the concept of the economic dispatch in a system with dispatch-
able loads and generators, respecting also the power flow laws. The purpose of an
Energy Market is to maximize the social welfare which is bound with the economic
dispatch.
3.2 Power Flow Problem
The ordinary power flow or the load flow problem is stated by the following given
data. The transmission topology is known and consists of nodes, busbars, loads,
generators and the static components, such as transformers, transmission lines, shunt
capacitors and reactors. The network formed by these static components can be
considered as a linear network and is represented by the corresponding admittance
matrix or impedance matrix, because the static components are represented by their
equivalent circuits consisting of R, L, C elements. The generators and loads are treated
as nonlinear components. Generators are represented PV nodes and loads as PQ
nodes.
PQ Nodes: For PQ nodes, the active and reactive power (P, Q) are specified as
known parameters, and the complex voltage (V, θ) is to be resolved.
PV Nodes: For PV nodes, active power P and voltage magnitude V are specified
as known variables, while reactive power Q and voltage angle θ are to be re-
solved.
Slack Bus: In load flow studies, there should be one and only one slack node spec-
ified in the power system, which is specified by a voltage, constant in magni-
tude and phase angle (V, θ). The effective generator at this node supplies the
losses to the network, which is achieved if one node has no power constraint
and can feed the required losses into the system.
The objective of the Power Flow Problem is to determine the set of variables
(P, Q, V, θ) at every node of the topology. The model of the transmission system is
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given in complex quantities since an alternating current (AC) system is assumed.
In every node we already know 2 out of 4 variables, so for n nodes, there are 2n
unknown parameters. These parameters can be found by obeying the Ohm’s and
Kirchoff laws:
I = YV
and
I˙i =
n
∑
j=1
YijV˙j,
where I˙i and V˙j are the injected current at bus i and voltage at bus j, respectively, Yij
is an element of the admittance matrix, N is the total number of nodes in the system.
Expressing I˙i into node power we have
Pi − jQi
Vˆi
=
n
∑
j=1
YijV˙j, i = (1, 2, ..., n)
where Pi, Qi are the injected active and reactive power at node i, respectively. If node
i is a load node, then Pi and Qi should take negative values. Vˆi is the conjugate of
the voltage vector at node i.
There are n complex equations, or 2n real equation, so our 2n unknown parame-
ters can be solved.
If the voltage vector adopts polar form, we have
V˙j = Vjejθj = Vj(cos θj + j sin θj)
where Vi, θi are the magnitude and phase angle of voltage at node i.
The admittance matrix is a sparse matrix, and the terms in∑ are correspondingly
few. The elements of admittance matrix can be expressed as
Yij = Gij + jBij.
This way the power equations become
Pi = Vi
n
∑
j=1
Vj(Gij cos θij + Bij sin θij)
Qi = Vi
n
∑
j=1
Vj(Gij cos θij − Bij sin θij)
where i = (1, 2, ..., n) and θij = θi − θj is the voltage phase angle difference between
node i and j. This is the polar form of the nodal power equations. The symbols and
the notation are taken from [10], which provides more extended details.
3.2.1 Newton-Rapshon Method
The Newton-Raphson Method is an efficient algorithm to solve non linear equations.
It will be presented briefly how it is applied to the Power Flow equations. We have
to determine voltages and angles at each node. We will exclude the Qi equations
of every PV bus, as their voltages are known but the reactive power Qis cannot be
fixed as a constrained. The reactive power will be computed after the iteration. Let
us assume that we have r PV buses and the slack bus is the first bus (with a fixed
voltage angle/magnitude). P, Q of the slack bus will be computed after the iteration.
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The above equations will be used for Pi, Qi. Pis is the given active power for every
node, Qis is the given reactive power for every PQ node.
This method begins with initial guesses of all unknown variables (voltage mag-
nitude and angles at Load Buses and voltage angles at Generator Buses). Next, a
Taylor Series is written, with the higher order terms ignored, for each of the power
balance equations included in the system of equations ([10]).
x =

θ2
...
θn
V2
...
Vn−r

, f(x) =

P2 − P1s
...
Pn − P1n
Q1 −Q1s
...
Qn−r −Q(n−r)s

.
In the above equations, node voltage angle θi and magnitude Vi are the variables
to be resolved. Here the number of θi is n − 1 and the number of Vi is n − r − 1.
There are 2n− r− 2 unknown variables in total and they can be solved by the above
2n− r− 2 equations (length of f(x) ).
The solving process of the Newton method roughly consists of the following
steps (Source):
1. Make an initial guess for x, x(0) , set v = 0.
2. While
∥∥∥f(x(v))∥∥∥ > e
(a) x(v+1) = x(v) − J(x)−1f(x(v)) where J(x) is the Jacobian matrix
(b) v = v + 1
The most difficult part of the algorithm is to construct and invert the Jacobian matrix
J(x) given as follows
J =

∂∆P
∂θ
∂∆P
∂|V |
∂∆Q
∂θ
∂∆Q
∂|V |
.
where
∆P =

P2 − P1s
...
Pn − P1n
.
∆Q =

Q1 −Q1s
...
Qn−r −Q(n−r)s
.
3.3 Optimal Power Flow Formulation
The goal of the Optimal Power Flow is to minimize an objective function, for exam-
ple one that concerns the generator costs. Generators power and voltages are not
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fixed, but input variables, and they have to be determined like the node voltages
[11]. The degree of freedom of the input may seem extremely large, but the prob-
lem is well defined because of the objective function. The objective function com-
bined with the power flow equations forms an optimization problem for the system,
[11]. The presence of the PF equations is the feature that distinguishes OPF from
other classes of power systems problems, such as classic Economic Dispatch, Unit
Commitment (UC), and market-clearing problems, [12]. The mathematical nature of
the problem changes dramatically because the input variables have constraints. Of
course, the solution methods performance depends on the nature of the given sys-
tem model or topology, e.g. on the type of nonlinearities, on the type of constraints,
on the number of constraints, etc.
3.3.1 Physical Load Flow/Equality Constraints
From the Power Flow Problem we have for every node i:
Pi(V, θ) = PGi − PLi = Vi
n
∑
j=1
Vj(Gij cos θij + Bij sin θij)
Qi(V, θ) = QGi −QLi = Vi
n
∑
j=1
Vj(Gij cos θij − Bij sin θij)
The equations are obtained by Section 3.2.
3.3.2 Operational Limits/Inequality Constraints
The input variables are limited and should not be exceeded for a stable, secure op-
eration [11] [12]:
• Limits on active power of a PV node (generator k) :
Plowk ≤ PPVk ≤ Phighk
• Limits on voltage of a PV or PQ node :
|V|lowi ≤|V|i ≤|V|highi
• Limits on voltage angles of nodes :
θlowi ≤ θi ≤ θlowit
• Limits on voltage angles between nodes :
Θlowij ≤ Θi −Θj ≤ Θlowij
• Limits on reactive power generation of a PV node (generator k) :
Qlowk ≤ QPVk ≤ Qhighk
In reality the reactive limits on a generator are complex and usually state de-
pendent. By adapting the actual limit values during the optimization, the real-
world limits can be simulated with sufficient accuracy.
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• Upper limits on active power flow in transmission lines :
Pij ≤ Phighi
• Upper limits on MVA flows in transmission lines :
P2ij + Q
2
ij ≤ S2highij
• Upper limits on current magnitudes in transmission lines :
|I|ij ≤|I|highi
• For simplicity we will omit transformers and shunt capacitances or reactances
from the system.
The last 3 equations are responsible for transmission congestion and affect the
Locational Marginal Price, as discussed in Chapter 2 .
3.3.3 The objective function
The constraints of the system have been defined. But these can lead to numerous
states for the model, without any objective function. This objective function can
be determined by the system operator and declares what is the goal of the power
system’s next state.
Various objective function are presented according to [12]–[14]:
1. Cost Objective or Economic Dispatch
This criterion, in general, minimizes the production costs of generating plants.
It will be discussed in detail.
2. Voltage Deviation Objective
This criterion minimizes the deviation of overvoltage and undervoltage condi-
tions for a given power system. The capability to minimize voltage deviation
will prevent power system instability and improve economic systems opera-
tion.
3. Loss Objective
Loss minimization increases the optimal power while guaranteeing minimum
cost of operation.
4. Flow Objective
This objective represents the determination of maximum mwer transfer capa-
bility of a given network.
5. Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch
This objective seeks an optimal solution from Economic Dispatch that remains
feasible under any of a pre-specified set of likely contingency events.
6. Security-Constrained Unit Commitment
The objective refers to the scheduling of generating units such that total op-
erating cost is minimized, with the difference that it operates across multiple
time periods and schedules the on–off status of each generator in addition to
its power output.
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It has to be noted that when we consider different objective functions, the equal-
ity and inequality constraints equations may change. The constraints that were de-
fined apply to the Economic Dispatch OPF problem, which will be considered to the
final implementation.
Cost Minimization
A Market Equilibrium in an Energy Market is achieved if the total Load Demand
-assuming it is non-dispatchable- will be met by the cheapest generators. The gen-
erators’ power prices can be given by asks, but in the general case, the production
prices correspond to the operational costs. That means that generators will supply
power to the grid only if it is beneficial for them - they should have none economical
losses-. In the case of dispatchable loads, there are no major technical differences.
The consumers who can pay the cheapest generators will be supplied with power.
As it can be seen, the Market Equilibrium is affected by the generators’ costs. A
lot of literature (e.g. [15] ) implies that in order to achieve an economic dispatch of
an Energy Markets, the generators costs should be minimized. This leads us to the
Optimal Power Flow Problem, which combines the power flow laws with the mini-
mization of an objective function, i.e the cost function of the system.
The operational costs can be quadratic or picewise linear. For example, in the
case of quadratic costs the cost function for Generator i is:
Fi(Pi) = ai ∗ P2i + bi ∗ Pi + ci,
where ai, bi, ci are predefined for every generator.
Then the objective function becomes:
F(P) =∑ Fi(Pi)
and the optimized solution is obtained by:
Minimize F(P)
The OPF formulation will be rephrased. For simplicity the system’s variables
will be divided into control and state variables:
• Control variables u : All real world quantities which can be modified to satisfy
the load - generation balance under consideration of the operational system
limits. If we use polar coordinates and omit transformers/shunt capacitances:
1. Active power of a PV node
2. Voltage magnitude of a PV node
• State variables x : This set includes all the variables which can describe any
unique state of the power system.
1. Voltage magnitude at all nodes
2. Voltage angle at all nodes
as described in [12], [16]. It stands that
X =
[
u
x
]
where X is the vector of the variables of the system (whole set).
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3.3.4 Optimal Power Flow Problem Formulation
The Problem is formulated related to the x, u state and control variables as:
minimize F(x, u)
subject to:
g(x, u) = 0,
where g represents the equality constraints as described in Section 3.3.1.
h(x, u) ≤ 0,
where h represents the inequality constraints as described in Section 3.3.2.
This symbolization is common in most related literature, and will be used through-
out the paper. The OPF Problem is well defined by the above equations and the
objective function.
3.4 Optimal Power Flow Solution Methods
The solution methods for the OPF problem are classified into two classes:
1. Traditional methods
2. Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods
Some solution methods will be quoted. For further details, [17]–[21] should be
advised.
1. Traditional methods
• Gradient Method
• Newton Method
• Linear Programming Method (LP)
• Quadratic Programming Method (QP)
• Interior Point (IP) Method
2. Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods
• Genetic Algorithm (GA)
• Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
• Artificial Bee Colony (ABC)
• Miscellaneous AI methods
• Generic technique for OPF problem decomposition
The detail analysis and description of these methods are beyond the scope of this
study. For our needs, we present in Table 3.1 a conclusive summary of such an anal-
ysis [17], [21].
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Objective function to be
optimized
Suitable method(s) Reason to use that
method
Economic dispatch Linear programming
(LP), Newton
Fast method
ED with non-smooth
cost functions
AI Non-linear problem
Reactive power
optimization
NLP, QP, IP, AI Accurate methods
Congestion Management AI Multi rated non- linear
problem
Security constrained NLP, IP Stable convergence
TABLE 3.1: Methods for different Objective Functions [17].
3.4.1 Interior Point Method
Extra emphasis is given to the Interior Point Method (IPM). The software tool se-
lected for this implementation uses this particular method in order to solve optimal
power flow problems. The method will be explained briefly according to [22].
The OPF formulation can be compactly written as a general nonlinear program-
ming problem:
min f (X)
subject to
g(X) = 0
hl ≤ h(X) ≤ hu
Xl ≤ X ≤ Xu
Note that the notation follows this paper’s one, like in the previous sections.
IPM encompasses four steps:
1. Transforms the inequality constraints into equality constraints by adding slack
variables to inequality constraints.
2. Non-negativity conditions are implicitly handled by appending them to the
objective function as logarithmic barrier terms.
3. Transforms the equality constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained
optimization one.
4. Solves the perturbed Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) first order optimality condi-
tions by the Newton method.
It is noteworthy to remark that IPM combines three concepts: logarithmic barrier
function to handle inequality constraints, Lagrange theory of optimization subject to
equality constraints and Newton method.
Following what we said above one transforms the inequality constraints into
equality constraints by adding slack variables to inequality constraints.
min f (X)
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subject to
g(X) = 0
h(X)− hl − sl = 0
−h(X) + hu − su = 0
sl, su ≥ 0
Now non-negativity conditions are added to the objective function as logarith-
mic barrier terms, resulting the following equality constrained optimization prob-
lem:
min f (X)− µ(ln sl + ln su)
subject to
g(X) = 0
h(X)− hl − sl = 0
−h(X) + hu − su = 0
where µ is a positive scalar called barrier parameter which is gradually decreased to
zero as iteration progresses. At the heart of IPM is the theorem from [23], which
proves that as µ tends to zero, the solution X(µ) approaches X? , the solution of the
problem.
The Lagrangian of the above equality constrained optimization problem is:
Lµ = f (X)−µ(ln sl + ln su)−λTg(X)−piTl (h(X)− hl − sl)−piTu (−h(X) + hu − su)
where the vectors of Lagrange multipliers λ,pil ,piu are called dual variables.
The perturbed Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) first order necessary optimality con-
ditions of the problem are:
∇slLµ = −µS−1l e+pil = 0
∇suLµ = −µS−1u e+piu = 0
∇pilLµ = −h(X) + hl + sl = 0
∇piuLµ = h(X)− hu − su = 0
∇λLµ = −g(X) = 0
∇XLµ = ∇ f (X)−∇g(X)λT −∇h(X)(piTl −piTu ) = 0
where e = [1, . . . , 1]T, Sl = diag(sl1, . . . , slp) and Su = diag(su1, . . . , sup).
The perturbed KKT optimality conditions are solved by Newton method. As
the goal is not to solve completely this nonlinear system for a given value of µ, one
makes a single iteration solving it approximately and then diminishing the value of
µ.
In this paper, no more emphasis will be given on how the Newton Method solves
the KKT conditions. It is not here the concern, as this procedure is automated be the
software tool that will be used - among with the whole Interior Point Method. For
further details, [22] should be studied.
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FIGURE 3.1: A comparison of selected features of selected software
tools similar to PyPSA [24].
3.4.2 Software Tools
The computation part of Optimal Power Flow Algorithms seems already compli-
cated. It is essential though for the Grid Analysis, which in combination with an
economic optimization of the grid, can produce a complete Energy Market. For the
research convenience, various software tools exist to analyze and simulate an input
system model. Most of them are presented in the Figure below, taken from PyPsa
[24] - a software toolbox for simulating and optimizing modern electrical power sys-
tems over multiple periods.
As Figure 3.1 indicates, researchers cannot lend exclusively on the software ca-
pabilities to produce economic efficient results, that obey the power flow laws. Some
software tools provide excellent Economic Analysis, but do not consider any power
flows - specialized on Energy systems with various components like batteries, hydro-
generators, solar generators, etc. On the other hand, some tools provide efficient
power flow results, but are very limited on energy issues and components.
For the implementation presented in this paper the PYPOWER [25] tool was
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PyPSA PYPOWER
Object-oriented, data stored in pandas
DataFrames
Numpy integer-indexed arrays
Non-linear power flow Non-linear problem
Only linear OPF Non-linear and linear OPF
Optimization over multiple time
points
Single time-point optimization
Generators, storage models, hydro,
sector coupling
Just generators
Mixed AC-DC modeling Just AC, single synchronous area
TABLE 3.2: PYPOWER characteristics based on [24].
used. PYPOWER is a power flow and Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solver. It is a
port of MATPOWER [26] to the Python programming language. Some PYPOWER
characteristics PYPOWER will be compared to PyPSA [24], as stated by PyPSA itself
in Table 3.2.
PYPOWER has been selected mainly for its flexibility. The main goal of the im-
plementation is to provide economic dispatch on a system with generators and con-
sumers, who both can be treated as generator entities in the tool. Moreover, the study
gives extra weight to a detailed Optimal Power Flow analysis which can by pro-
vided by PYPOWER. Concerning continuous simulation of the grid, PYPOWER can
be connected with Mosaik [27], a smart grid framework that provides optimization
over multiple time points.
Finally, as it will be later elaborated, distributed OPF algorithms can easily in-
teract with PYPOWER in order to achieve a decentralized coordination -without a
centralized System Operator- and simultaneously an economic dispatch.
It should be pointed out that PYPOWER uses the Interior Point Method to solve
Optimal Power Flow problems. Extended details of this method can by found in
[28]–[33].
3.5 Conclusion
System Operators have to maximize the social welfare at the Electricity Market they
run. When the system topology consists of transmission lines and different buses,
some physical laws have to be respected. Conventional Optimal Power Flow -
minimizing the costs of generation - can provide an economic dispatch of the sys-
tem, consistent with the power flow equations. Software tools can help with the
computation of the OPF Problem, and PYPOWER will be used for this paper’s im-
plementation.
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Chapter 4
Distributed Optimal Power Flow
4.1 Reasons for Decentralization
The OPF Problem needs a central coordinator for an optimal solution. As it was
mentioned in Chapter 2, the market consists of participants with different incentives.
Everyone wants to maximize its profit, but simultaneously not to face any economic
risks during the procedure. Different trust issues arise from this procedure, as a
centralized System Operator is a natural monopoly. No one can be sure that the
System Operators acts for the public benefit and does not try to manipulate the final
dispatch for his own interest [34].
The fundamental problem centers on getting market pricing in place to provide
the proper decentralized operating and investment incentives while creating the as-
sociated property rights to allow market-based investments to go forward. Ironi-
cally, despite the importance of long-run investment, for reasons that are peculiar to
electricity, the critical pricing rules and conditions arise in the wholesale spot mar-
ket. In order to provide better incentives for long-term market-based investments
that support reliability, it is critical to provide the prices in the spot-market that re-
flect actual operation of the grid [4], [34].
Moreover, after the OPF problem is solved, the System Operator is responsible
for gathering all the payments and distributing them among the suitable partici-
pants. If congestion revenues are controlled by the System Operator, trust among
generators, consumers and the central Authority (the System Operator) may not be
ensured. The market equilibrium may not reflect the true one, providing extra profit
to the centralized operators.
Furthermore, decentralized System Operators can decompose a difficult OPF
problem into subproblems, as it is explained in [35]. As power systems are large in-
terconnected systems with a high degree of complexity, the control of such systems
is a challenging task. Centralized optimal power flow with taking the entire grid
into account is often not feasible. Reasons are the size of the resulting optimization
problem but also the concurrent control of the system by several independent enti-
ties. To facilitate the application of optimal control to large-scale systems, the overall
problem may be decomposed into subproblems which are solved in a coordinated
way. This also complies with the above mentioned fact that the task of controlling a
system might be shared by several entities of which each is in charge for a dedicated
part of the system. For power systems, which generally include hundreds or thou-
sands of lines and buses, the subproblems are very often associated with distinct
areas. Traditionally, especially in Europe, the areas correspond to countries and the
control entities are the transmission system operators.
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4.2 The Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
Some algorithms have been proposed to solve the distributed optimal power flow
problem. One of them is the ADMM algorithm. The system topology will be divided
into multi-areas/regions and every region has a System Operator. The Distributed
System Operators solve OPF problems locally, producing optimal schedules. As
the regions are connected through transmission lines, one local solution affects the
neighbor solution. If a global optimization is to be met, the regions have to exchange
information between them, solve new OPF problems based on the information re-
ceived and finally converge to globally accepted solution - the Market Equilibrium.
Research in [36] introduces the key aspects of the Distributed Coordination and
addresses the applications:
" The term distributed will denote a solution which is fully decentralized, which
does not need any form of central coordination, which evolves by local message ex-
changes, and which is scalable. We assume that the communication and control net-
work is organized in regions, each with a local coordinator taking charge of the local
processing, and of the data exchange with neighboring regions. The interest in such
a challenging solution is linked to the possibility of application over large scales,
and is nowadays studied in a wide variety of application fields, the most widely
known and simpler formulation being the one of average consensus ,i.e.,of calculating
an average in a distributed fashion [37], [38]. In the context of power electronics, the
interest in such a distributed solution is also linked to security/privacy concerns.
Privacy of information can be in fact guaranteed whenever neighboring regions ex-
change only a limited amount of information relating to the status of nodes at the
boundary, which is in fact one of the targets of decentralized OPF. Distributed ap-
proaches are also naturally suited for improving system reliability in the presence of
faulty processes. "
4.2.1 ADMM Introduction
Decentralized OPF approaches were first proposed in [39]. Unlike traditional previ-
ous approaches to parallel non-contingency constrained (NCC) OPF (see [40]) , a de-
composition of the overall OPF problem into regions was proposed. Optimal power
flows for each region are solved and the multiple OPFs are coordinated through an
iterative update on constraint Lagrange multipliers. The iterative updates require
the exchange of a very modest amount of data between adjacent regions. This ap-
proach is suitable for distributed implementation because of the very small amount
of data that must be transferred between processors and is the first demonstration
of the viability of large-scale distributed OPF. But this approach requires that some
information is exchanged between all regions involved in the optimization process,
so it is not fully decentralized.
Similar approach was in [41] where decomposition-coordination is applied di-
rectly to the interior point method (IPM) used for solving the (OPF) problem. The
approach employs a preconditioned conjugate gradient method to guarantee con-
vergence (e.g., see [42]), which is a form of highly centralized management. If this
approach needs to be fully decentralized, convergence is not guaranteed (see [36]).
Decomposition of the semi definite programming (SDP) relaxation of the OPF
problem was also proposed ([43]). But the drawbacks are that much more compu-
tational effort is needed than IPM and that the algorithm is assured to converge in
specific contexts only (e.g., with radial distribution networks).
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However, the ADMM algorithm ([44] [45]) can be applied to OPF problems which
are completely distributed/decentralized, i.e., do not require any form of central co-
ordination, and are applicable to any network. The solution is based upon a region-
based (local) optimization process, where a limited amount of information is ex-
changed only between neighboring regions in a (locally) broadcast fashion [36].
4.2.2 ADMM Background
We begin with a brief review of dual decomposition and the method of multipliers,
two important precursors to ADMM. This review can be found in [46]:
Dual Ascent
Consider the equality-constrained convex optimization problem:
minimize f (x)
subject to Ax = b
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L(x, y) = f (x) + yT(Ax− b)
and the dual function is
g(y) = inf
x
L(x, y) = − f ?(−ATy)− bTy
where y is the dual variable or Lagrange multiplier and f ? is the convex conjugate
of f , background in [47].
The dual problem is
maximize g(y)
In the dual ascent method, we solve the dual problem using gradient ascent. Assum-
ing that g is differentiable, the gradient ∇g(y) can be evaluated as follows. We first
find x+ = argminx L(x, y); then we have∇g(y) = Ax+− b, which is the residual for
the equality constraint. The dual ascent method consists of iterating the updates
xk+1 = argmin
x
L(x, yk)
yk+1 = yk + αk(Axk+1 − b)
where αk > 0 is a step size, and the superscript is the iteration counter.
Dual Decomposition
The major benefit of the dual ascent method is that it can lead to a decentralized
algorithm in some cases. Suppose, for example, that the objective f is separable:
f (x) =∑
i
fi(xi)
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Partitioning the matrix A = [A1, ..., AN ] and Ax = ∑Ni=1 Aixi, the Lagrangian can be
written as
L(x, y) =
N
∑
i=1
Li(xi, y) =
N
∑
i
( fi(xi) + yT Aixi − (1/N)yTb)
This means that the x-minimization step splits into N separate problems that can be
solved in parallel. Explicitly, the algorithm is
xk+1 = argmin
x
Li(xi, yk)
yk+1 = yk + αk(Aixik+1 − b)
The x-minimization step is now carried out independently, in parallel,for each i.
In the general case, each iteration of the dual decomposition method requires a
broadcast-and-gather operation.
Augmented Lagrangians and the Method of Multipliers
Augmented Lagrangian methods were developed in part to bring robustness to the
dual ascent method, and in particular, to yield convergence without assumptions
like strict convexity or finiteness of f .
Lρ(x, y) = f (x) + yT(Ax− b) + (ρ/2)‖Ax− b‖22
where ρ > 0 is called the penalty parameter. (Note that L0 is the standard La-
grangian for the problem.) The augmented Lagrangian can be viewed as the (unaug-
mented) Lagrangian associated with the problem
minimize f (x) + (ρ/2)‖Ax− b‖22
subject to Ax = b
Applying dual ascent to the modified problem yields the algorithm
xk+1 = argmin
x
Lρ(x, yk)
yk+1 = yk + ρ(Axk+1 − b)
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
ADMM is an algorithm that is intended to blend the decomposability of dual ascent
with the superior convergence properties of the method of multipliers. The algo-
rithm solves problems in the form:
minimize f (x) + g(z)
subject to Ax + Bz = c
As in the method of multipliers, we form the augmented Lagrangian
Lρ(x, z, y) = f (x) + g(z) + yT(Ax + Bz− c) + (ρ/2)‖Ax + Bz− c‖22
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ADMM consists of the iterations
xk+1 = argmin
x
Lρ(x, yk, zk)
zk+1 = argmin
z
Lρ(xk+1, y, zk)
yk+1 = yk + ρ(Axk+1 + Azk+1 − c).
In ADMM x and z are updated in an alternating or sequential fashion, which
accounts for the term alternating direction. ADMM can be viewed as a version of the
method of multipliers where a single Gauss-Seidel pass over x and z is used instead
of the usual joint minimization. Separating the minimization over x and z into two
steps is precisely what allows for decomposition when f or g are separable.
Convergence of ADMM
Assumption 1: The (extended-real-valued) functions f , g are closed, proper, and
convex. This implies that the subproblems arising in the x-update and z-
update are solvable.
Assumption 2: The unaugmented Lagrangian L0 has a saddle point. This implies
that if (x?, z?, y?) is the saddle point, then (x?, z?) is the optimal solution and
y? is dual optimal.
Under assumptions 1 and 2, the ADMM iterates satisfy the following:
1. Residual convergence, the iterates approach feasibility.
2. Objective convergence, the objective function of the iterates approaches the
optimal value.
3. Dual variable convergence, y? where is a dual optimal point.
The proof of convergence can be found in [46].
4.3 ADMM in Optimal Power Flow
The OPF Formulation for Distributed ADMM follows the methodology in [48]. This
formulation is also implemented in the experiments of this paper. One specification
of this formulation is that it does not take into consideration the transmission line
constraints. In the experiment cases, no contingencies occurred so this specification
does not affect the results. A lot of literature also omits the presence of transmis-
sion constraints, making the computation part simpler. Congestion is not so often in
real-time electricity systems, so in most cases, transmission constraints are never vi-
olated. Different OPF formulations for distributed ADMM can be found in [7], [36],
[45], [49]–[52].
The OPF problem is decomposed into regions. Each region does not have in-
formation about the topology/buses/constraints/costs of the other regions, it only
needs to interact with its neighbors. A globally optimal solution will be given by the
ADMM. In order for that to happen, neighbor regions need to exchange information.
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FIGURE 4.1: Duplicating voltages at boundaries of regions.[48]
Tielines, i.e connecting transmission lines between two neighbors, are treated like in
Figure 4.1 :
Duplicating the voltages on region boundaries results in that the tielines are re-
moved and the regions are totally separated. As it was explained in Section 4.2, each
region’s OPF problem consists of the following equations :
minimize f (P) - i.e. the total generators’ costs within the region.
subject to : equality and inequality equations as described in Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2.
Because of the interface voltages decomposition (Figure 4.1), two more equality
constraints are added for region A, which has region B as a neighbor - bus i and
bus j are their interface buses respectively (more neighbors would add more voltage
equality constraints of the same form) [48]:
Vi,A −Vj,A = Vi,B −Vj,B
Vi,A +Vj,A = Vi,B +Vj,B
We define:
zk = (zi,j−, zi,j+) = ( β−(Vi,A −Vj,A), β+(Vi,A +Vj,A) )
where β− and β+ are scaling factors. Constant β− is set to be larger than β+ to give
more weight to Vi,A −Vj,A , which is strongly related to the line flow through tie line
ij, [53].
and, the feasible region of all the z’s associated with tie lines is defined as
Z = {(z−, z+)| z−i,j = −z−j,i , z+i,j = z+j,i , ∀(i, j) ∈ inter-region tielines}
And the problem is reformulated using the xk = {(Pi, Vi, Qi, θi)|∀ bus i} variable
(the set of control and state variables of k region for every regional bus i - containing
the duplicated neighbor ones. We have for each k region (omitting transmission lim-
its) :
minimize fk(xk)
subject to:
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Akxk = zk, i.e. the boundary voltages in respect of xk
g(xk) = 0, i.e. the power flow equality constraints.
xkmin ≤ xk ≤ xkmax , i.e. operational limit inequality constraints.
zk ∈ Z, i.e equalities in boundary voltages between neighbors.
For more details about notations, symbols or the problem formulation, see Sec-
tion 3.3. For simplicity, we express the constraints { g(xk) = 0 , xkmin ≤ xk ≤ xkmax } as
xk ∈ Xk . Because of the limitation z ∈ Z, it is obvious that information needs to be
exchanged between neighbor regions, it is the only constraint that does not depend
totally on region k. An important property of problem above is that if z is fixed, then
the problem can be decomposed into subproblems where each subproblem only con-
tains the local variables xk . This property enables distributing the computations of
ADMM to solve the whole problem.
As the OPF problem has been decomposed into subproblems - one for each region -
it is useful to think that the ADMM algorithm needs to be integrated for the variable
exchange between the regions. As it was shown before, the ADMM computes local
solutions by taking account variables from the other subproblems. This is exactly
what needs to be done in order to coordinate the regions into a global optimal solu-
tion.
The ADMM algorithm minimizes the Augmented Lagrangian function of the
problem, which is given as follows for region k:
Lk(xk, zk,λk) = fk(xk) + +λkT(Akxk − zk) + 12‖Akxk − zk‖
2
ρk
The vector ρ is a vector of penalty parameters whose entries are increased during
the iterative process [48] to ensure convergence of ADMM [45]. The (v+1)-th iteration
of the local ADMM consists of the following steps:
xv+1k = argmin
xk
Lk(xk, zvk ,λ
v
k)
zv+1k = argmin
zk
Lk(xv+1k , zk,λ
v
k)
λv+1k = λ
v
k + diag(ρ
v
k)(Akx
v+1
k − zv+1k )
Notes: The parameter ρ is updated for faster convergence according to [48]. In
the problem formulation some other parameters exist also which tuned optimally
according to [54], [55]. As a convergence guidance, the regional primal residue
Γv+1k =
∥∥∥Akxv+1k − zv+1k ∥∥∥∞ is used.
To enhance the performance of ADMM on non-convex problems, the penalty
parameter ρ is usually updated to make the Augmented Lagrangian function convex
near the solution. Specifically, for any region k, ρk is updated as follows [53]:
ρ∼v+1k =
{∥∥ρvk∥∥∞ 1, if Γv+1k ≤ γΓvk
τ
∥∥ρvk∥∥∞ 1, otherwise
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FIGURE 4.2: Distributed ADMM for OPF. [48]
with constants 0 < γ < 1 and τ > 1, and with 1 denoting the all-ones vector.
ρv+1k,i,j = max{ρ∼v+1k,i,j , ρ∼v+1l,j,i }
meaning that we select the maximum ρ from {ρk, ρl} for each tieline (i, j) between
regions k and l in order to robust the convergence and is achieved by exchanging
local ρ between neighbor regions.
A detailed procedure of the distributed ADMM algorithm for region k is illus-
trated in Figure 4.2.
A general way to check the convergence of is to check whether the primal residue
(Γk, ∀k) is smaller than some e. However, in the AC OPF problem, power balance
feasibility must also be ensured. This feasibility is checked after averaging the du-
plicate voltages in each iteration. Convergence is declared when both the primal
residue and the maximum bus power mismatch (after voltage averaging) fall below
e [48], [53].
Our study is based on the above described algorithm. Specifically, we utilize this
algorithm to implement the prototype of our decentralized energy market system to
be present in the subsequent chapter.
4.4 Conclusion
It has been widely accepted that for the Economic Dispatch in an Energy System,
an Optimal Power Flow Problem needed to be solved. This was done by a central
Authority/Operator who had every information needed about the topology and the
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system’s components. However, this rises different kind of incentives and it cannot
be certain that every information is provided.
With the integration of the ADMM algorithm, the centralized OPF problem is
decomposed into subproblems. The problem becomes decentralized, as different
regions/System Operators are coordinated towards a global optimal solution. In-
formation exchange between these regions is obligatory in order for the solution to
obey the Power Flow laws.
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Chapter 5
Utilizing Blockchain Technology
for Decentralization
5.1 Blockchain Background
Instead of presenting directly the aspects of the Blockchain Technology, firstly the
problem that it solves is specified. In that way, the main idea and purposes of
the Blockchain Technology will be initially approached. The following problem is
stated:
Some digital entities needs to be passed from parties to parties securely. For
example, this digital entity represents a digital currency. Parties need to exchange
money (no physical money is transacted) without the presence of a third party, for
example a bank. The role of the third party is to validate transactions and prevent
any double spending. Double spending occurs when the same money is used for
more than one transaction. Every information is passed through the third party,
which decides if a transaction is to be accepted or rejected. This environment is
a natural monopoly, as a third party has the power and the ability to control the
whole system. This problem - i.e. double spending in the absence of a third party -
was firstly solved by the first blockchain cryptocurrency, Bitcoin in 2009.
A brief explanation of this blockchain technology is presented in [56], which pro-
vides more technical details and makes the following clear statement:
"A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow on-line
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going
through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the so-
lution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still re-
quired to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-
spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network times-
tamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based
proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing
the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the se-
quence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool
of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by
nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they’ll generate the
longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal
structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can
leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work
chain as proof of what happened while they were gone."
The benefits of blockchain can be described as:
Decentralization: There is not a middle man/third party to control the system.
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Transparency and trust: All the transactions are public and can be seen by everyone
(public ledger of transactions).
Immutability: Once the data has been written into the blockchain, it is almost im-
possible to be changed.
High availability: The system is based on thousands of nodes in a peer-to-peer net-
work, which continues to work even if nodes leave the network or become
inaccessible.
Authenticity: All transactions on a blockchain are cryptographically secured and
provide integrity.
5.2 Blockchain Architecture
A blockchain is a decentralized, distributed and public digital ledger that is used
to record transactions across many computers so that the record cannot be altered
retroactively without the alteration of all subsequent blocks and the consensus of the
network. This allows the participants to verify and audit transactions inexpensively.
A blockchain database is managed autonomously using a peer-to-peer network and
a distributed timestamping server ([57]).
The elements of the Blockchain and the Network Model are presented according
to [56]. This architecture corresponds specifically to cryptocurrencies that utilize
Blockchain (here in Bitcoin), however the main aspects will remain the same for this
paper’s implementation.
• Transactions
We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner trans-
fers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction
and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A
payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership (Figure 5.1a).
• Blocks
Blocks hold batches of valid transactions that are hashed and encoded into a
Merkle tree. Each block includes the cryptographic hash of the prior block in
the blockchain, linking the two (Figure 5.1b). The linked blocks form a chain.
This iterative process confirms the integrity of the previous block, all the way
back to the original genesis block (first block of the blockchain).
• Timestamp Server
A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be times-
tamped and widely publishing the hash. The timestamp proves that the data
must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each
timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with
each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it (Figure 5.1c).
• Network
The steps to run the network are as follows:
1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
2. Each miner-node collects new transactions into a block.
3. When a miner-node creates a new block, it is broadcast to all nodes.
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(A) Transaction Model
(B) Block Model
(C) Timestamped Blocks (Blockchain).
(D) Blockchain Network
(Source).
FIGURE 5.1: Blockchain Structure [56].
4. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not al-
ready spent.
5. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the
next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previ-
ous hash.
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep
working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next
block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that
case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case
it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next new block is found and
one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch
will then switch to the longer one.
5.3 Consensus in Blockchain
With the absence of a third party that validates the transaction, the double spend-
ing problem needs to be solved. This is why various consensus mechanisms were
introduced into the blockchain technology. Based on these mechanisms, network
participants agree on the validity of transactions. The consensus mechanisms are
projected to the The Byzantine Generals Problem, as [58] states:
"We imagine that several divisions of the Byzantine army are camped
outside an enemy city, each division commanded by its own general. The
generals can communicate with one another only by messenger. After
observing the enemy, they must decide upon a common plan of action
(attack or retreat in the simple case). However, some of the generals may
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FIGURE 5.2: Byzantine Generals Problem with oral messages [58].
FIGURE 5.3: Byzantine Generals Problem with signed messages [58].
be traitors, trying to prevent the loyal generals from reaching agreement.
The generals must have an algorithm to guarantee that:
1. All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action.
2. A small number of traitors cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt
a bad plan."
So, one characteristic of distributed systems is the Byzantine fault tolerance
(BFT) and it describes if the system is able to defend against failures of system com-
ponents with or without symptoms that prevent other components of the system
from reaching an agreement among themselves, where such an agreement is needed
for the correct operation of the system. The consensus mechanisms have to be BF
tolerant in order to continue providing the system’s service as originally intended.
In The Byzantine Generals Problem, tolerance is based on two scenarios ([58]).
The first scenario assumes that messages may be forged (oral messages). This
scenario will be Byzantine-fault-tolerant as long as the number of traitorous generals
does not equal or exceed one third of the generals: Impossibility results if messages
are forged and traitors ≥ 13 generals . An example where the problem cannot be
solved is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
The second scenario requires unforgeable message signatures and can provide Byzan-
tine fault tolerance in the presence of an arbitrary number of traitorous generals. A
solveable example is illustrated in Figure 5.3. It is noted that in the example, the
lieutenants find out that the commander is a traitor because his signature appears
on two different orders.
The analytical theory and the algorithms to solve the Byzantine Generals’ Prob-
lems can be found in [58].
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5.3.1 Consensus Mechanisms
As it was explained in the previous subsection, the Consensus Mechanisms protect
the system against malicious processes or actions and assist to "healthy" operation.
The system becomes trustful to the participants, providing security. Various con-
sensus mechanisms are used in the Blockchain technology and the ones used in
Ethereum platform will be presented briefly. For a better understanding, the reader
should be familiar with how the blockchain actually works and with concepts like
blocks, blockchain, miner, validator, forger, smart contracts etc.
Proof of Work (PoW) is the consensus mechanism in Bitcoin and Ethereum. A per-
son’s innocence is confirmed by having them do a sure work which is trou-
blesome but straightforward. Once they have done this work, it can be early
verified. The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed,
such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The aver-
age work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can
be verified by executing a single hash: implement the proof-of-work by incre-
menting a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block’s hash
the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it sat-
isfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work.
As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include
redoing all the blocks after it. [56], [59]. PoW runs on a system of “the longest
chain wins.” So assuming most miners are working on the same chain, that
one will grow fastest will be the longest and most trustworthy. Hence Bitcoin
is safe as long as more than 50% of the work being put in by miners is honest.
Proof of Stake (PoS) Unlike the proof-of-work, where the algorithm rewards min-
ers who solve mathematical problems with the goal of validating transactions
and creating new blocks, with the proof of stake, the creator of a new block is
chosen in a deterministic way, depending on its wealth, also defined as stake
(blocks are said to be ‘forged’ or ‘minted’). So validators that suggest the next
block are selected pseudo-randomly. Then a multi-round voting mechanism
determines which block gets finally added to the chain. If forgers validate a
fraudulent transaction, they lose their holdings, as well as their rights to par-
ticipate as a forger in the future. The common argument against proof-of-stake
is the Nothing at Stake problem. The concern is that since it costs validators al-
most no computational power to support a fork unlike PoW, validators could
vote for both sides of every fork that happens. However, it is resource friendly
(no computational power is needed) and the 51% problem does not exist. In
PoS, the 51% attack means that the attacker holds the 51% of the cryptocur-
rency’s wealth. There is no incentive for someone to attack a network in which
he controls most of the shares.
Proof of Authority (PoA) is a modified form of Proof of Stake (PoS) where instead
of stake with the monetary value, a validator’s identity performs the role of
stake, i.e. it is known that this identity will never perform malicious acts.
It does not depend on nodes solving arbitrarily difficult mathematical prob-
lems, but instead uses a set of "authorities" - nodes that are explicitly allowed
to create new blocks and secure the blockchain. The chain has to be signed
off by the majority of authorities, in which case it becomes a part of the per-
manent record. This makes it easier to maintain a private chain and keep the
block issuers accountable, [60].
40 Chapter 5. Utilizing Blockchain Technology for Decentralization
For consortium setting there are no disadvantages of PoA network as com-
pared to PoW. It is more secure (since an attacker with unwanted connection or
hacked authority can not overwhelm a network potentially reverting all trans-
actions), less computationally intensive (mining with difficulty which provides
security requires lots of computation), more performant and more predictable
(blocks are issued at steady time intervals), [60].
5.4 Ethereum Network Elements
In this section, more emphasis will be given in the Ethereum Network, as a pri-
vate Ethereum network will be used for this implementation. It is noted that the
Ethereum Network has similar architecture with the one mentioned above. The key
elements remain the same. For a better understanding of the implementation and
results, some of these elements are described in detail. The detailed presentation is
taken from [61].
Value
In order to incentivise computation within the network, there needs to be an agreed
method for transmitting value. To address this issue, Ethereum has an intrinsic cur-
rency, Ether (ETH). The smallest sub-denomination of Ether, and thus the one in
which all integer values of the currency are counted, is the Wei. One Ether is defined
as being 1018 Wei (Table 5.1).
World State
The world state (state), is a mapping between addresses (160-bit identifiers) and ac-
count states (a data structure serialised as RLP). Though not stored on the blockchain,
it is assumed that the implementation will maintain this mapping in a modified
Merkle Patricia tree (trie). The trie requires a simple database backend that main-
tains a mapping of bytearrays to bytearrays; this underlying database is named the
state database.
The account state comprises of four fields, two of them are presented:
• nonce : A scalar value equal to the number of transactions sent from this ad-
dress or, in the case of accounts with associated code, the number of contract-
creations made by this account.
• balance : A scalar value equal to the number of Wei owned by this address.
Multiplier Name
100 Wei
1012 Szabo
1015 Finney
1018 Ether
TABLE 5.1: Ether subdenominations [61].
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The Transaction
A transaction (formally, T) is a single cryptographically-signed instruction constructed
by an actor externally to the scope of Ethereum. While is assumed that the ultimate
external actor will be human in nature, software tools will be used in its construc-
tion and dissemination. There are two types of transactions: those which result in
message calls and those which result in the creation of new accounts with associ-
ated code (known informally as ‘contract creation’). Both types specify a number of
common fields (some of them presented):
• nonce : A scalar value equal to the number of transactions sent by the sender.
• gasPrice : A scalar value equal to the number of Wei to be paid per unit of gas
for all computation costs incurred as a result of the execution of this transac-
tion.
• gasLimit : A scalar value equal to the maximum amount of gas that should be
used in executing this transaction. This is paid up-front, before any computa-
tion is done and may not be increased later.
• to : The 160-bit address of the message call’s recipient or, for a contract creation
transaction.
• value : A scalar value equal to the number of Wei to be transferred to the
message call’s recipient or, in the case of contract creation, as an endowment
to the newly created account.
• data : An unlimited size byte array specifying the input data of the message
call.
Every transaction has a specific amount of gas associated with it: gasLimit. This
is the amount of gas which is implicitly purchased from the sender’s account bal-
ance. The purchase happens at the according gasPrice, also specified in the trans-
action. The transaction is considered invalid if the account balance cannot support
such a purchase. It is named gasLimit since any unused gas at the end of the trans-
action is refunded (at the same rate of purchase) to the sender’s account. Gas does
not exist outside of the execution of a transaction.
The Block
The block in Ethereum is the collection of relevant pieces of information (known as
the block header ), H, together with information corresponding to the comprised
transactions, T, and a set of other block headers U that are known to have a parent
equal to the present block’s parent’s parent (such blocks are known as ommers). The
block header contains several pieces of information, some of them are:
• difficulty : A scalar value corresponding to the difficulty level of this block.
This can be calculated from the previous block’s difficulty level and the times-
tamp.
• number : A scalar value equal to the number of ancestor blocks. The genesis
block has a number of zero.
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• gasLimit : A scalar value equal to the current limit of gas expenditure per
block.
• gasUsed : A scalar value equal to the total gas used in transactions in this
block.
Smart Contracts
Smart contract is a major key element in Ethereum, which boosted its popularity
also. The idea of the smart contracts is presented briefly, but no further details will
be given, as this paper’s implementation does not utilize smart contracts.
Blockchain-based smart contracts are contracts that can be partially or fully exe-
cuted or enforced without human interaction. One of the main objectives of a smart
contract is automated escrow.
Ethereum Solidity enables the coding of contracts that will execute when speci-
fied conditions are met. A smart contract would be enabled by extensible program-
ming instructions that define and execute an agreement. Ethereum Solidity is an
open-source blockchain project that was built specifically to realize this possibility by
implementing a Turing-complete programming language capability to implement
such contracts. [57]
5.5 Blockchain in Energy Markets and Smart Grids
Blockchain technology is becoming more and more popular. Decentralized pay-
ments are a hot trend nowadays, getting integrated also in Smart Grids. The appear-
ance of blockchain in these energy grids is more and more frequent and indicates
that payments and energy trading among participants can be secure, decentralized
and immediate.
There are various proposal in the literature about how blockchain technology
can develop Energy Markets and Grids. A lot of them have been studied and a
common direction between them has been found. Most of these proposals integrate
Blockchain for financial transactions facilitation. Some of these proposals can be
found in [62]–[64] and some of their schematics are illustrated in Figures 5.4, 5.5 .
A novel paradigm will be given. One can imagine autonomous electronic devices
(Internet of Things -IoT) which are able to "ask" for energy whenever they need -
or when energy is cheaper. Machines that consume more electricity (e.g. washing
machines) will decide by themselves to operate at night, when electricity is cheaper.
Blockchain technology gives the ability to these devices, to pay for the energy they
consume immediately and completely automatically.
Moreover smart contracts ([61]) can organize autonomously energy schedules.
Long term energy agreements are settled in an Energy Market, because Spot Markets
arise risks and instabilities concerning the clearing prices. Smart Contracts are used
to activate payments between the agreeing parties when energy actually is traded,
and not beforehand. Consumers do not pay in advance for energy that they might
not consume (e.g. impossible power transmission due to the power flow laws).
Smart contracts can also behave as auctioneers in Energy Markets. The asks and
bids by generators and consumers are sent to a smart contract and the smart con-
tract is responsible for finding the optimal clearing price. As the smart contract is
public and immutable, no manipulation to the final schedule is feasible. The system
becomes trustful as no incentives arise.
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FIGURE 5.4: Proposed Blockchain Application to the Electricity In-
frastructure by [62].
Blockchain is also a huge database. Smart meters may record every energy trans-
action - with timestamp - in the public ledger, and the system operators may charge
the participants for what they consumed.
It has to be mentioned that new decentralized digital currencies have been in-
troduced. An example is [65] and is used for buying and selling green energy in
the smart grid. This currency is generated by injecting energy into the grid (Fig-
ure 5.6a). Another example is [66], used in a localized peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity
trading model for locally buying and selling electricity among plug-in hybrid elec-
tric vehicles (PHEVs) in smart grids. Participants are rewarded - in currency tokens
- for discharging their PHEVs to balance local demand (Figure 5.6b).
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FIGURE 5.5: Proposed Architecture by [63].
(A) Schematic Setup by [65].
(B) Localized P2P electricity trading among
PHEVs in [66].
FIGURE 5.6: Energy Cryptocurrencies Examples.
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Blockchain in decentralized
Optimal Power Flow
The main idea of the proposals in the previous chapter is that the Blockchain in an
Energy Market provides immediate payments among participants and schedules en-
ergy trades. However, all these proposals do not consider the Power Flow Problem.
Or they assume that the power flow problem is already solved. Blockchain lays in
an upper level than the power flow, there is no interaction between them. Most of
the proposals concentrate on local Energy Markets where there are no transmission
lines. But everything changes when the problem is formulated in a system with
transmission topology. Arrangements, settlements may not correspond to the real-
ity if transmission and operational limits are not considered. Electricity is a special
product and it cannot be controlled beforehand at a reasonable cost.
In this paper, the Blockchain Technology will be used as a decentralized Application
in order to solve the Optimal Power Flow problem. A centralized System Operator
is absent from this system. Decentralized System Operators (e.g. regions) will co-
ordinate between them in order to find the optimal locational clearing prices for the
system. The purpose is not to concentrate completely on payment and schedule is-
sues, but to propose an alternative use of blockchain. It will be the backbone of com-
munication between the regions. Regions send their local solution to the optimal
power flow problem through cryptographic transactions to the neighbors. "Send-
and-Gather" of this information helps the coordination to direct towards the glob-
ally optimal solution. After the globally optimal solution is found, all the iteration
process is stored to a new block in the blockchain, recording a complete history of
optimal power flow problems, iterations and solution. The blocks are created by a
specific consensus mechanism. Authorized nodes in this private Ethereum network
will constantly check the transaction pool (Proof of Authority). If they discover that
an optimal power flow problem has converged, i.e. a global optimal solution has
been found, then they create the new block (Proof of ADMM-convergence). For
more technical details the reader should be advised by [61].
6.1 Design and Implementation
A private Ethereum network is set for the communication between the regions. An
input topology is given in PYPOWER-caseformat [25], which is divided into regions.
Each region sets its own local optimal power flow problem, having information
only about the neighboring interface. The exact topology in other regions is un-
known. The local optimal problem is formulated like in the ADMM methodology
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(Section 4.3). The solution to each ADMM iteration is obtained by the PYPOWER In-
terior Point Solver. After each iteration, neighbor values of the solution are encoded
as Ethereum transactions in order to be sent to the neighbors. The regions utilize
RPC-calls to the Ethereum nodes in order to broadcast these transactions to the net-
work - we assume one region is associated to one node. Transactions are gathered in
the transaction pool - common for all. Each regions is able to find out new neighbor
values from its neighbor regions, update its local problem based on these values and
continue to a new ADMM iteration. When every region has converged, a globally
optimal solution has been found. Authorized miners in the network inspect contin-
uously the transaction pool. When convergence of the problem has been remarked,
a new block is created containing every transaction exchange between the regions.
In Figure 6.1A an decentralized Optimal Power flow problem is illustrated. For
simplicity, the problem contains 3 regions and a few buses. In Figure 6.1B , the post-
actions of each region (here of Region 3) are illustrated. The post-actions express
the preparation of the algorithm - i.e. the actions each region needs to do, before
executing the ADMM algorithm.
In Figure 6.2 the execution of the ADMM-OPF algorithm is illustrated (for exam-
ple for Region 3 following the problem in Figure 6.1). The figure presents the steps
of the algorithm and which component of the architecture is responsible for each
step.
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(A) A given Optimal Power Flow Problem (Adapted from here).
(B) Preparation actions of each region (e.g. Region 3) Schema.
FIGURE 6.1: Preparation of the algorithm per region for a given prob-
lem. (Images adaptations from [48], here)
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FIGURE 6.2: Algorithm Implementation in the Architecture. (Images
adaptations from [48], here)
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6.2 Experimental Analysis
In the next section, different experiments are presented in order to test the quality,
the convergence and other characteristics of the algorithm. Experiments vary on the
initial values and the algorithm’s parameters.
6.2.1 Quality and Convergence of Solution
The primal residual for the next cases is selected to be 10−3. Flat Start indicates that
the initial values for the ADMM problem are random. On the other hand, Warm
Start indicates that values close to the solution are used for initialization.
In this section, the number iterations needed per region until convergence will
be presented. The Locational Prices are plotted in respect to the optimal/true Loca-
tional Prices obtained by the centralized OPF. Power Generation per region will also
be compared with the centralized solution. It has to be noted that with the following
cases, the Locational Prices are affected by how much generation each generator-bus
produces and at what cost - the generation cost is given by αP2 + βP+ γ, with α, β,γ
taken from the case data and P obtained by the final solution. The locational Price at
one bus may reflect the total generation cost at the same bus.
30-Bus IEEE Case (Flat Start)
The IEEE 30 Bus Test Case (Figure 6.3) represents a portion of the American Elec-
tric Power System (in the Midwestern US) as of December, 1961. This case has 6-
generators and is divided into 3 regions.
FIGURE 6.3: The IEEE 30-Bus Test Case (Source).
The results of the decentralized OPF for the 30-Bus Case are shown in Figures 6.4, 6.5.
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(A) Iterations until convergence per region. (B) Locational Prices at the Buses.
FIGURE 6.4: Convergence and Prices of the 30-Bus Case.
The Locational Price at Bus 8 deviates the most from the centralized solution
(Figure 6.4b). With a careful look at the case data, it lies on binding transmission
constraints to bus 8 - our implementation does not consider line constraints. As it
will be shown later, this deviation - that happens at one bus only! - is responsible
for generators to produce different amount of power than they were supposed to.
These differences are calculated up to 40% total generators’ production deviations.
FIGURE 6.5: Active (top plots) and Reactive (bottom plots) Power
Generation between the Decentralized and Centralized solution of
the 30-Bus Case.
From Figure 6.5, it is shown that the biggest deviations are related to the Reactive
Power Q. That happens because the cases do not have tight limitations about the Q
generation. Reactive Power Q is also not involved in the objective function, so its
solution values are not restricted by the model. Because of the absence of these re-
strictions, the graphs will continue without plotting the Reactive Power deviations.
39-Bus Case (Flat Start)
The 39-Bus Case (Figure 6.6) is generally representative of the New England 345 KV
system, but is not an exact or complete model of the actual New England 345 KV
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system. There are 3 regions and generators lie from Bus 30 to Bus 39.
The results of the decentralized OPF for the 30-Bus Case are shown in Figures 6.7,
6.5.
FIGURE 6.6: The 39-Bus Case (Source).
(A) Iterations until convergence per region. (B) Locational Prices at the Buses.
FIGURE 6.7: Convergence and Prices of the 30-Bus Case (Flat Start).
Already, it is clear (Figure 6.7) that the number of buses of two different cases
may be close enough but the solution could need much more iterations until con-
vergence. The number of iterations depends on the network’s complexity (how the
buses are connected, where the generators are, how many tie-lines exist between
different regions), as well on some parameters of the ADMM algorithm (details and
experiments are presented in the next sections). Moreover, this case was free of
binding transmission constraints and so the Locational Prices are very close to the
centralizes solution.
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FIGURE 6.8: Active Power Generation between the Decentralized and
Centralized solution of the 39-Bus Case (Flat Start).
39-Bus Case (Warm Start)
Firstly, when Warm Start is referred, it means that some initial values of the algo-
rithm are close to the solution. Note that it does not coincide with a "perfect" start,
that would give convergence and satisfying results into a very small number of it-
erations. Through experiments, an accepted Warm Start would be to initialize some
regions (e.g. just one) to their previous solutions, and the others should start from
fixed initial values. This Warm Start gives the possibility for further parameter anal-
ysis.
(A) Iterations until convergence per region. (B) Locational Prices at the Buses.
FIGURE 6.9: Convergence and Prices of the 30-Bus Case (Warm Start).
(A) (B) (C)
FIGURE 6.10: Active Power Generation between the Decentralized
and Centralized solution of the 39-Bus Case (Warm Start).
As it can be shown from Figures 6.9, 6.10, the number iterations between the flat
and the warm startis reduced. However, while the warm start gives us less iteration,
there are bigger deviations from the centralized solution. In this particular case (39-
bus case) the slack bus (bus 31) deviates the most. Its power production is around
6.2. Experimental Analysis 53
100MW less, resulting in lower prices. Speaking economically, the slack bus "loses"
the most, as it produces less power than it should.
Modified 118-Bus Case (Flat Start)
The IEEE 118 Bus Test Case (Figure 6.11) represents a portion of the American Elec-
tric Power System (in the Midwestern US) as of December, 1962. This case is not
divided beforehand into regions, so for the purpose of this analysis it is manually
divided into two regions. One region contains every generator-bus and the other
contains only load-buses. The total generation of the region with the generators is
plotted (the other region does not generate power), apart from the residual analysis.
The results are shown in Figure 6.12.
FIGURE 6.11: 118-Bus Case (Adapted from here).
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(A) Iterations until convergence per region. (B) Locational Prices at the Buses.
(C) Active Power Generation between the
Decentralized and Centralized solution.
FIGURE 6.12: 118-Bus Case Results.
The above cases are compared in some metrics in Table 6.1. As it was expected
the Convergence Time depends not only on the particular case but also on how much
computation time per iteration is needed. Although the algorithm per iteration is the
same for every case, the Clock Time depends on the given topology per region (how
complex the problem is, how many tielines, how many generators, etc.).
Cases
Convergence
Time (secs)
Average
Time per
ADMM
iteration
(secs)
Objective
Function
Value ($/h)
Gap in
Objective
Function
(%)
30-Bus 45.6 0.023 573 0.66
39-Bus (Flat Start) 521.7 0.209 42 0.06
39-Bus (Warm Start) 32.0 0.022 42 0.04
118-Bus 659.9 0.265 132 1.68
TABLE 6.1: Metrics on different Cases.
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Mosaik-Framework
A very useful framework for Smart-Grid co-simulation is the Mosaik [27]. It pro-
vides the ability to simulate continuous power flows at a certain topology. Different
components can also be instantiated: households, PV-nodes, batteries, etc.
An experiment of the distributed ADMM algorithm for Optimal Power Flow
will be tested on this framework. However, due to lack of datasets and incompati-
bilities between the framework and this paper’s implementation, the input topology
needed to be modified. The topology used was taken from mosaik-demo. House-
holds from mosaik-householdsim were connected to the buses as specified in the
dataset. The optimal power flow problem needs some generators to be declared,
and this was done manually - the generators’ cost were declared equal.
So, the topology includes of 38-buses. 37 Households (i.e. fixed loads, changing
from time to time) are connected to each bus. There are two generators in total and
the topology is divided into two regions. The simulation runs for a whole day and
the total production of each generators is displayed in Figure 6.13.
(A) Power Generation of Generator 1 (B) Power Generation of Generator 2
FIGURE 6.13: Mosaik simulation for 2 generators from different re-
gions.
From Figure 6.13, it is clear that Generator 1 supplies much more power to the
topology, although the generators’ costs are equal. With a careful look on the topol-
ogy, this seems absolutely expected as Generator 1 is "closer" to the most households.
6.2.2 Blockchain - Gas Usage
The nodes in the Ethereum network need to consume gas in order to be able to send
transactions. The ADMM algorithm demands exchangeable information between
the regions, meaning that the nodes in the network who "represent" the correspond-
ing regions need to have the necessary gas resources. For the normal operation of
the Ethereum network, every node is supplied with unlimited gas. However, a Gas
Usage Analysis is done for a better understanding. The total expected gas by each
iteration per region is plotted (Figure 6.14). After the block is mined, it is possible to
calculate the total gas that was used (Figure 6.15).
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(A) 30-Bus Case (B) 39-Bus Case (Flat Start) (C) 39-Bus Case (Warm Start)
FIGURE 6.14: Estimated Gas until Convergence for different Cases.
FIGURE 6.15: Gas Usage per case.
Comparing the Flat with the Warm Start, the Gas Used in the first case is 10 times
larger, which is totally expected as the iterations in the first case are near 300, but in
the second case just near 25. More iterations mean more transactions and that is why
the gas used differs in both cases.
Expected Gas Used
The interface values are encoded into hex-values in order to be sent through trans-
actions in an Ethereum network. The gas needed in order to send one transaction
with some data is (given the default Ethereum values):
gas ≈ 2100+ 68 ∗ DataByteLength
In our case, our interface values need encoding into their hex representative values.
The transactions in the Ethereum need the Data to be in this special format. This
affects the DataByteLength per transaction.
More specifically, the variables that are sent between the neighbors are trans-
formed into a Jason format and this format is encoded into its Hex-representative.
The bytes that are sent are dependent on this Jason format, and there is no point to be
tested in detail. We define JSON f ormatij() as the format of the current transaction
sent between region i and j. And the function BytesToEncode(), the bytes needed
to encode a JSON format to their hex representative. We define JSON f ormatij() as
the format of the current transaction sent between region i and j. And the function
BytesToEncode(), the bytes needed to encode a JSON format to their hex representa-
tive.
In the implementation 12 float values need to be encoded into hex bytes, among
with their string names - that are used in a JSON format. Let us define the next val-
ues per region i :
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nbi : total neighbor regions for region i
tlij : total tielines - i.e. interfaces - between region i and its neighbor region j
nreg: total number of regions
FloatBytes : Bytes needed to represent a float into hex bytes - it depends by the
architecture and is constant.
StringBytes : Bytes needed to represent a string into hex bytes - it depends by
the string’s length and should contain more characters because of the JSON format.
iterationsi: total iterations for region i until convergence.
Empirically, the DataBytes needed for one transaction from region i to region j
are given by :
DataBytesPerTransaction =
BytesToEncode(JSON f ormatij((3+ 8 ∗ tlij + nreg) ∗ Floats + 12 ∗ JSON f ields))
So, the total gas used by region i until convergence is given by:
Gasi ≈ iterationsi ∗ (
nbi
∑
j
2100+ 68 ∗ DataBytesPerTransaction]
Again, it needs to be noted that this formula corresponds to this particular im-
plementation.
Block creation
Network miners are examining constantly the Transaction Pool. If they found out
that a problem has reached convergence, they will create a block with all the solution
history. However, in the Ethereum private network the block creation depends on
how much gas was used, what the gas price or the gas limit is. That is because one
block may not be able to contain every transaction of the solution because of gas
limitations. Moreover, in proof of authority - which is used in this implementation -
miners create blocks every standard time periods. The time period is declared at the
genesis block.
To check how many transactions can be contained in a single block, the next
formula has to be tested.
GasCost = GasUsedperTransaction ∗ GasPriceperTransaction
Gas Used per transaction depends on the data that a transaction contains and Gas Price
per transaction is set by the node that sends a transaction. However it has to be noted
that if the gas price is too low, no one will process the transaction. Even if gas price is
selected arbitrarily, it needs to be set between safe boundaries, so that the transaction
sent is not declined by the network.
Then if GasCost < BlockGasLimit, all the transaction history can fit into a single
block. Otherwise, more than one blocks will be created, until every transaction is
contained into one.
Continuing as before, we define:
nreg: Total number of regions
Convergence_t : Total time until the ADMM algorithm has converged for a
given problem.
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BlockPeriod: The time period for block creation. It is declared in the genesis
block.
Gas_Price: It is set by the node that sends the transaction. We will assume
every node/regions have a common gas price set for every transaction.
Gasi : It is the total gas used by each region i until convergence. Details were
given in the previous subsection.
Block_GasLimitτ: Gas Limit defines how much Gas Cost -i.e. number of trans-
actions - can fit into a single block. It is not constant and it changed through time.
Details can be found in [61]. So, we suppose that we know the Gas Limit value at
time τ.
The total time ConvergedBlocks_t needed to include every transaction into blocks
after convergence at time τ is given approximately by:
Convergence_t +
⌈
(
nreg
∑
i
Gasi ∗ Gas_Price)/Block_GasLimitτ
⌉
∗ BlockPeriod
6.2.3 Convergence Robustness
The convergence time and the number iterations - affecting the number of transac-
tions that is sent - are dependent on the initial values and parameters of the ADMM
problem. One important parameter is ρ, which accelerates the convergence [53]. If
the initial values are far from the solution, a small ρ should be selected. On the other
hand, larger ρ needs much less iterations.
In Figure 6.16 , the number of iterations between a Flat Start and different Warm
Starts is compared, which correspond to the 39-Bus Case. It is accompanied by Fig-
ure 6.17 which illustrates the Power Deviations for each case. It is to be noticed, that
with the Warm Starts, we get satisfying results about the deviations in respect to the
number of iterations. Although the error in generation is increasing, the iterations
have been reduced dramatically. Less iterations result into less gas usage and less
computation power. Quality of Solution competes against Fast Convergence when
moving from Flat to Warm Start.
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(A) Flat Start (B) Warm Start from (A)
(C) Warm Start from (B)
FIGURE 6.16: Convergence between different Starts for the 39-Bus
Case.
FIGURE 6.17: Power Generation Deviations for different Starts in the
39-Bus Case.
The experiments will continue with the same case (39-bus) but the load/demands
at the buses will be changed. In a real balanced system, the loads do not change
dramatically from time to time, but small input differences are applied. This is the
case that is tested in Figure 6.18 and Figure 6.19. It is shown that with small input
differences, the algorithm converges fast enough (due to the Warm Start) and the
deviations from the centralizes solution remain in acceptable intervals.
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(A) Flat Start (B) Warm Start and 5% Demand increase
(C) Warm Start and 5% Demand reduction
FIGURE 6.18: Convergence with different Demands in the 39-Bus
Case.
FIGURE 6.19: Power Generation Deviations for different Demands in
the 39-Bus Case.
When we start the algorithm "warmly", we use the final ρ from the previous solu-
tion as our new ρ. However, smaller ρ should be selected when there is uncertainty
about the input values and how close they are to the previous problem. In the next
experiments (Figure 6.20), smaller ρ will be selected and will be compared to ρ ob-
tained by the warm start. In the first case, the problem will be exactly the same with
the original. In the second, there will be 5% reduction in demand - this problem was
selected as it produced the biggest deviations.
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FIGURE 6.20: Power generation deviations changing ρ from Warm
Start.
From Figure 6.20, it is observed that the correct initial selection of ρ depends on
the input data. Smaller ρ on uncertain situations behaves much more well, while
large ρ boosts the convergence.
In Figure 6.21 different initial selection of ρ are tested for Flat Starts. The devi-
ation results (Figure 6.22) indicate the one should be careful on the ρ selection: It
should be set to a small value to guarantee a good algorithm outcome even when
starting from a point very far from the optimum, while big values of ρ need much
less iteration to converge. Every case has an optimal ρ that combines the best per-
formance with the smallest deviations.
FIGURE 6.21: Iterations until convergence based on initial ρ selection
in the 39-Bus Case. ρ = 104, 105, 106 from left to the right.
FIGURE 6.22: Deviations based on initial ρ selection in the 39-Bus
Case.
Another parameter that affects convergence is the primal residual selection. It is
expected that small residuals need more iteration but are expected to deviate less
from the optimal solution, while larger residuals behave in the other way.
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In Figures 6.23, 6.24 different primal residuals are tested for the 30-Bus Case. This
case deviated the most from the optimal solution, that is why it is selected. As it
is shown, moving from Flat Start to Warm Start and reducing the primal residual,
i.e. more precision, the number of iterations remains in the same levels. The com-
bination of the Warm Start and the reduction of the primal solution provides less
deviations, as it was expected by the primal residual selection.
(A) e = 10−3, Flat Start (B) e = 10−4, Warm Start (C) e = 10−5, Warm Start
FIGURE 6.23: Convergence based on different primal residuals e in
the 30-Bus Case.
FIGURE 6.24: Deviations based on different primal residuals in the
30-Bus Case.
The blockchain is a huge database. This characteristic can help System Operators
to select the suitable initialization values. As every block is timestamped, the Oper-
ators could select starting points for the topology based on time, period, season, etc.
From the previous experiments, the performance of the algorithm depends on the
correct selection of different parameters for each case. Accessing these parameters
as they are stored in the blockchain for different cases could robust the convergence
without deviating from the optimal solution.
6.3 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge the only work that combines Energy Markets with
Blockchain Technologies, respecting the Power Flow limits, can be found in [7].
In the abstract of that paper we read the following statements:
"Using the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), we
pose a decentralized optimal power flow (OPF) model for scheduling
a mix of batteries, shapable loads, and deferrable loads on an electricity
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distribution network. The DERs perform local optimization steps, and
a smart contract on the blockchain serves as the ADMM coordinator, al-
lowing the validity and optimality of the solution to be verified. The
optimal schedule is securely stored on the blockchain, and payments can
be automatically, securely, and trustlessly rendered without requiring a
microgrid operator."
It is clear that this is also an architecture which solves decentralized optimal
power flow problem with the ADMM method, using as communication backbone
the blockchain technology. The algorithm of this architecture is presented in Fig-
ure 6.25. However, the two architectures have notable differences.
FIGURE 6.25: Algorithm of the Similar Architecture [7]
6.3.1 Differences
• Fully decentralized vs Partly decentralized
This paper’s implementation guarantees verified results under a fully decen-
tralized model. That means that the region need to know only their regional
topology, having no information about the "outer" topology. The ADMM al-
gorithm is constructed in a way which the regions need to communicate only
with their neighbors in order to converge towards a global solution.
On the other hand, in [7] it is stated that
"We assume that the network topology is fully known by all parties,
and have not considered changes in line impedances (e.g. due to
temperature changes) or in topology (e.g. due to outages)."
Moreover, the presence of a smart contract as an ADMM Aggregator, which
gathers all the local ADMM step-solutions and updates the next-iteration prob-
lem, yields that the topology is known for all - it is implemented in the smart
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contract. In other words, if a different topology is given as an input, a new
smart contract must be created for the new problem. This limitation sets a
barrier on the automated operation of the blockchain.
• No Smart Contract vs Smart Contract
In a real blockchain network the Gas Resources are not unlimited but are pur-
chased. Every transaction in order to be sent needs to consume some gas,
which arises limitations against the normal operation of the network. More-
over, a smart contract needs to be supplied with enough gas in order to pro-
duce the expected results. It has to be noted that every computation in a smart
contract uses extra gas and depends on the computation’s complexity.
In [7] every local voltage solution xi is sent to the smart contract and the smart
contract responds with the updated global variable z - every regions selects the
suitable zi. The smart contract consumes some extra gas for the z-update (not
complex computations though). The absence of a smart contract produces less
transactions, as every node can update its z-value based on the information
received by the neighbors. Unfortunately, gas usage comparison cannot be
done between the two implementation, because it depends strongly on the
transactions nature - and this information is not available.
6.4 Future Work
Future Work will include the following improvements. The first one is the ability
of the implementation to consider line transmission constraints. Binding constraints
affect the Locational Prices and limit the power transmission from cheap generators.
Although such a phenomenon does not occur often in the reality, it has to be imple-
mented for better and more accurate results. This can be done by suitable changes
in the ADMM algorithm, taking into consideration more inequality constraints.
The second would integrate automated payments by every consumer for the
power consumed. The blockchain technology provides naturally this possibility -
similar work and relevant discussion was presented in Section 4.2. After an opti-
mal solution has been found, the regions could send their final variables to a smart
contract which would take care of the billing between the participants. Of course,
the smart contract would need to collaborate with smart meters in order to ascer-
tain the actual power that is generated and consumed. It is natural to think that
some fraud detection algorithms should be developed. Payments and billings arise
different kind of incentives that could manipulate the final globally optimal solu-
tion. The system should be able to identify regions or system operators who behave
maliciously.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this paper, the drawbacks of a centralized Energy Market were stated. The need
for decentralization is unambiguous, but some challenges are faced. In a given a
topology which consists of generators, consumers and transmission lines, the Op-
timal Power Flow (OPF) Problem needs to be solved, which provides an economic
dispatch of the system. The social welfare of the market participants is maximized
and everyone finds incentive to join the market. It was shown that this decentral-
ization was possible with the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
algorithm. The topology is now divided into autonomous regions, with each one
solving a local OPF problem. The regions need to exchange information to converge
to a globally optimal solution. The Blockchain Technology serves as a communica-
tion backbone and is suitably adapted on the ADMM algorithm, which constitutes
the main contribution of this paper.
An architecture which divides an Economic Dispatch problem into regions, solv-
ing OPF problems with the ADMM was designed. The regions were representing
nodes in an Ethereum private network. In this network, the information exchange is
more than feasible and every Economic Dispatch solution is stored in a blockchain.
Experimental Analysis indicated satisfying results of this architecture. Similar re-
search and future research are also highlighted.
Blockchain seems to work for our problems but it not clear how well it will scale
in real cases. For this it is worth to investigate new public ledger technologies that
are based on more general structures. For example IOTA addresses the shortcoming
of scalability and high transaction fee which is not suitable for machine economy
like the case in our study. Instead of blockchain IOTA is based on Directed Acyclic
Graphs which might offer a better mapping of the power grid onto the IOTA public
ledger. Such mapping has the potential to accelerate the convergence of our iterative
scheme. Preconditioning could also accelerate the iteration procedure. Please note
that the lack of smart contract capability which is a major drawback currently on
IOTA does not have an impact of our approach.
We close with the following rather philosophical comments. Our efforts for de-
centralization do not really focus on developing an excellent dApp platform for next
generation energy markets. It mainly concerns about sharing energy in a socially
correct and effective way. It is to find the most optimal way to evolve as a commu-
nity that follows social and physical laws at the same time. It’s after all about the
root essence of what energy and money means, to the people.
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